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Abstract 
 We analyse the effects of a large increase in Slovenia‘s minimum 
wage in March 2010 using administrative data covering the entire population 
of labour force participants. We find that the minimum wage increase had a 
significant and sizable negative effect on the job retention of minimum wage 
recipients, especially of young and low-education workers, and also led to an 
increased probability of job-to-job transitions for minimum wage recipients. 
In addition, we find evidence of spillover effects of the minimum wage 
increase on wages higher in the wage distribution, with the effects 
monotonically decreasing with wages but still present at 150 percent of the 
new minimum wage. The results are based on a difference-in-differences 
approach in which the treatment group is comprised of workers whose wages 
at the time of the introduction of the minimum wage raise were below the 
new minimum wage, and the control group is comprised of workers whose 
wages were slightly above the new minimum wage. 
 
Keywords: Minimum wage, worker flows, employment, wages, wage 
distribution, labour productivity, spillover effects, Slovenia 
 
Introduction 
 In March 2010, Slovenia dramatically increased the statutory 
minimum wage, from 597 to 734 euros gross per month, or by 22.9 percent. 
The magnitude of this increase strongly exceeded that of previous minimum 
wage adjustments following the introduction of a minimum wage in 1995, 
and, oddly, coincided with the economic slowdown that started in 2008. 
After the increase, which placed Slovenia second among all EU countries by 
the ratio of minimum to average wage, the number of minimum wage 
earners has been steadily increasing and by 2014 more than doubled.  
 Both the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of 
minimum wages on labour market outcomes has been voluminous – without 
reaching a consensus about employment effects. Recent studies based on 
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micro data and quasi-experimental approaches mostly show that high 
minimum wages negatively affect worker and job flows, reduce employment 
and inhibit its recovery (see, for example, Neumark, Schweitzer and 
Wascher 2004 for the United States, and Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and 
Philippon 2000, and Portugal and Cardoso 2006, for France and Portugal, 
respectively). Studies also show that these effects are stronger for vulnerable 
groups and that they disproportionally affect sectors with high shares of 
minimum wage recipients. But there are also many empirical studies that 
report positive and/or statistically insignificant effects of minimum wages on 
employment and labour market transitions (for example, Card and Krueger 
1995, Stewart 2004, and Dickens and Draca 2005; see an overview by 
Neumark and Wascher 2010).  
 
Less controversial is the evidence that minimum wage increases affect 
wage distribution. 
 Wages of workers at the bottom of the wage distribution are most 
directly affected, but minimum wages also affect wages higher up in the 
wage distribution via spillover effects (see Neumark, Schweitzer and 
Wascher 2004 for an overview). This effect has led several authors to 
conclude that minimum wages have an important contribution to reducing 
wage inequality in developed countries (see Neumark and Wascher 2010). 
 In recent years, the minimum wage policy in Slovenia has come 
under heated debate. Trade unions defend the current level and indexation 
practices related to minimum wage, pointing to anti-poverty effects of the 
minimum wage and the reduction of wage inequality in recent years. But 
others – including the government think-tank IMAD as well as the OECD 
and European Commission – warn about the negative effects of the 2010 
increase of the minimum wage on international competitiveness of the 
Slovenian economy.
9
 Noting that Slovenia recorded one of the largest 
reductions in economic activity in EU in the post-2008 crisis and at the same 
time undergone the largest increase in the minimum wage, IMAD (2013) 
also attributed a loss of 7,000 jobs in the short term, and 18,000 in the long 
term, to the post-2009 minimum wage hike.
10
 
                                                          
9
 In its latest communication, the European Council (2014) voiced a concern over the limited 
progress in implementing its last year's recommendation on the minimum wage, and OECD 
(2013, p. 7) recommends: ―Following a 23 percent hike in 2010, the authorities should 
ensure that the minimum wage declines relative to the median wage over time and adopt a 
new social agreement introducing wage moderation over an extended period of time to 
support Slovenia‘s competitiveness.‖ 
10
 The estimates are predictions based on the estimation of nation-wide labor demand 
function by Brezigar Masten, Kovačič, Lušina and Selan (2010). 
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 The objective of this paper is to rigorously evaluate employment and 
wage distribution effects of the 2010 Minimum Wage Law, taking advantage 
of an exceptionally rich, administrative microdata of both workers and firms. 
On the employment and labour market transition front, the paper addresses 
the questions whether the minimum wage hike increased the flow of workers 
from employment into unemployment, inactivity, or another job; and 
whether it reduced the probability of entry to employment for the likely 
candidates for minimum wage, for example, for young and low-skilled 
workers. On the wage distribution front, the paper addresses the question 
whether the sharp increase in the minimum wage increased the concentration 
of low-wage workers, and whether there have been spillover effects that 
increased wages of higher-paid workers. 
 We find that the minimum wage increase had a significant and 
sizable negative effect on the job retention of minimum wage recipients, 
especially of young and low-education workers, and also led to an increased 
probability of job-to-job transitions for minimum wage recipients. In 
addition, we find evidence of spillover effects of the minimum wage increase 
on wages higher in the wage distribution, with the effects monotonically 
decreasing with wages but still present at 150 percent of the new minimum 
wage. The results are based on a difference-in-differences approach in which 
the treatment group is comprised of workers whose wages at the time of the 
introduction of the minimum wage raise were below the new minimum 
wage, and the control group is comprised of workers whose wages were 
slightly above the new minimum wage. The analyses are done at the level of 
individual workers using administrative data on the population of Slovenian 
labour force participants spanning the 2005-2012 period. The data permit us 
to precisely identify minimum wage recipients – thus overcoming a common 
problem in wage studies using administrative data – and track the individuals 
over time, which facilitates the precision of the estimates. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background by describing the February 2010 Minimum Wage Law, presents 
the dynamics of nominal and relative minimum wages as well as the number 
of minimum wage earners after the Law took effect, and compares 
Slovenia‘s minimum wage to the one in other EU Member States. Section 3 
describes data and methodology of the study. Section 4 presents the results 
of the effects of the minimum wage increase in March 2010 on employment 
transitions and wage distributions.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
Minimum wage in Slovenia  
In Slovenia, a legally mandated minimum wage was introduced in 1995.
 The concept of the minimum wage replaced the system of 
―guaranteed wage‖ – a relic from the socialist past that relied on solidarity to 
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guarantee the payment of minimum wages.
11
 The 1995 minimum wage law 
reflected the consensus among social partners to raise the prevailing 
minimum gross earnings to about 40 percent of the average national gross 
wage. It is estimated that at the time of introduction, the minimum wage de-
facto increased by 48 percent (Laporšek 2014). Since 1995, minimum wage 
legislation has undergone numerous changes, most of them concerning the 
level of the minimum wage and the adjustment mechanism of the minimum 
wage to macroeconomic parameters (Kresal 2001, Brezigar Masten et al. 
2010). 
 The most substantial changes in minimum wage legislation were 
introduced with the February 2010 Law on Minimum Wages. First, the law 
strongly increased the amount of the minimum wage – from 597 EUR to 734 
EUR gross, or by 22.9 percent – to correspond to the value of the minimum 
consumption basket per person (see IMAD 2013). Second, the law altered 
the adjustment mechanism of the minimum wage to macroeconomic 
parameters. The new law introduced automatic, full indexation to consumer 
price index growth – and allowed for additional increases to reflect wage, 
employment or GDP growth (Article 3). Because of the unprecedented rate 
of increase, the February 2010 law stipulated that employers could apply for 
a gradual transition – consisting of three discrete jumps – to the new 
mandated minimum wage, to be completed by December 31
st
, 2011.
12
 
 The February 2010 Minimum Wage Law strongly increased the ratio 
between the minimum and the average nominal wage and helped the real 
minimum wage grow much faster than average real wage. In 2009, the ratio 
between the minimum and the average nominal wage was 41.2 percent, and 
it increased to 47.6 percent in 2010 (43.2 for firms with gradual adjustment 
schedule), 49.1 percent in 2011 (45.8 for firms with gradual adjustment 
schedule), 50 percent in 2012, and 51.5 in 2013 (Figure 1). Moreover, the 
February 2010 Minimum Wage Law created a huge divergence of growth 
between real minimum wage and real average wage. Compared to 2009, by 
2013 the minimum wage in real terms increased by 31 percent (by 22.5 
percent in 2010 alone – see Figure 1). In contrast, reflecting the decline of 
general economic activity as well as austerity measures in the public sector, 
                                                          
11
 The solidarity reflected in the determination of the so-called ‖socially warranted earnings 
fund‖ of the firm (see Vodopivec 1993). 
12
 The conditions for adopting a gradual transition were very lenient. A gradual increase of 
the minimum wage could be adopted by firms for which immediate transition would lead to 
large losses that would jeopardize the existence of these firms or to layoffs of a large 
number of workers for business reasons (Art. 9 of the Mininum Wage Law). According to 
the Labour Inspectorate (2010) a gradual transition to the stipulated minimum wage was 
adopted by 1611 companies. 
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the real average wage recorded growth only in 2010, when it grew by 1.8 
percent, to be followed by small, steady decreases during 2011–13.13 
 It comes as no surprise that in the wake of February 2010 Minimum 
Wage Law, the number of minimum wage earners more than doubled. In 
February 2010, there were 17,552 minimum wage earners – 2.7 percent of 
total workforce, and in March 2010 that number increased to 43,325 – 6.7 
percent of total workforce (Figure 2).
14
 The number of minimum wage 
earners increased also in subsequent years so that in 2013, on average, there 
were 50,569 minimum wage earners – 8.3 percent of the workforce. The vast 
majority of minimum-wage earners (84 percent in 2013) were employed in 
the private sector. As regards sector of activity, almost 80 percent of all 
minimum wage earners was employed in four industries: manufacturing (31 
percent), retail (18 percent), other business services (15 percent) and 
construction (12 percent). All together, market services employed 68 percent 
of all minimum wage earners (data for December 2013). 
 Growth in number of firms employing at least one minimum wage 
earner followed a similar pattern and sharply increased in March 2010. The 
number of firms with at least one minimum wage earner increased from 3243 
(7.3 percent of all firms) in February 2010 to 7378 (16.8 percent of all firms) 
in March 2010 (Figure 3). A marked increase in the number of firms that 
employ at least one worker with the minimum wage is observed at the 
beginning of the year, reflecting the gradual adaptation to the new minimum 
wage (up to and including the year 2011) and the regular January legislative 
alignment with the consumer price index in the previous year. According to 
the latest available data, as of December 2013 there were 8507 firms (21.7 
percent of all firms) employing at least one minimum wage earner.  
 The strong March 2010 increase of the minimum wage brought 
Slovenia to the forefront among the EU countries by the ratio of the 
minimum to the average wage. Among all 21 EU Member States that 
mandate a national minimum wage, in 2012 this ratio was the highest in 
France (49.8 percent), followed by Slovenia (48.3 percent) and Malta (46.8 
percent) – see Table 1.15 Slovenia‘s ratio exceeded the average of all 21 EU 
Member States by 10 percentage points – in most countries, this ratio ranged 
                                                          
13
 In fact, positive aggregate private sector nominal wage growth during 2009–2013 was 
largely driven by composition effects in the structure of employment, as lower-paid workers 
suffered disproportionately large job losses during Slovenia‘s recession (Kajzer, Hribernik, 
Perko and Selan 2013). 
14
 According to the Monthly Reports on Paid Wages (SORS 2014). Firms included in these 
reports cover 86 percent of total Slovenia‘s employment. 
15
 Minimum wages in other countries – notably in Austria, Germany and Scandinavian 
countries – are determined via collective agreements (see Laporšek 2013). In Scandinavian 
countries, minimum wages tend to exceed government-mandated minimum wages of 
countries in continental Europe. 
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between 30 and 40 percent. Slovenia held second place, again behind France, 
also by the ratio of the minimum to the median wage (see Table 1).   
 Although several other countries have increased the real value of the 
minimum wagein recent years, Slovenia‘s adoption coincided with an 
unusually large contraction of GDP. Among the countries which during 
2008–2012 increased the minimum wage in real terms, Slovenia‘s increase 
was by far the largest (followed by Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria). At the 
same time, Slovenia was one of three EU Member States that in this period 
recorded the highest real GDP decline (IMAD 2013). In contrast, the highest 
real GDP growth during this period occurred in Poland that recorded a 
reduction of the minimum wage in real terms. 
 
Data and methodology 
Data 
 The data used in this paper are created by linking several 
administrative databases covering the entire Slovenian workforce. For each 
worker, the data contains information on employment, unemployment and 
wages for the 2005–2012 period. Individuals‘ records from various databases 
are linked via their unique, masked personal identification number. The 
resulting database combines the following administrative data sources: 
(a) Work history data. It contains starting and ending dates of an 
employment spell, the type of appointment, occupation, employer 
identification code, and personal characteristics (gender, age, and 
education). The data are collected as part of social insurance and 
are maintained by the Statistical Office of Slovenia. 
(b) Data on registered unemployment. It contains starting and ending 
dates of an unemployment spell, destinations of exit from 
unemployment, as well as information on the receipt of 
unemployment insurance benefits. Personal and family 
characteristics pertaining to each spell are also included. The data 
are provided by the Employment Service of Slovenia. 
(c) Worker earnings data. It contains information on earnings 
associated with each employment spell of an individual (amount 
of earnings, number of hours worked, starting and ending date of 
earnings period). This database is provided by the Pension and 
Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia. 
 In addition, the following two firm-level data sources are used:  
(a) Firm-level minimum wage recipient data. It contains information 
on gross wages paid for regular hours and overtime and data on 
number of workers and minimum wage earners at the firm level. 
The source of the data are 1-ZAP/M forms, maintained by the 
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Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and 
Related Services.  
(b) Data on delayed adoption of the new minimum wage. It contains 
information on the number of firms who have applied for a 
gradual, two-year delayed adoption of the minimum wage. The 
data are provided by the Labour Inspectorate of the Republic of 
Slovenia. 
 It has to be stressed that the rich database used in this 
analysis enhances the accuracy of identification of workers to be included in 
the treatment group beyond that of studies done for other countries. The 
effects of the minimum wage increase can be identified at a more granular 
level than in studies that exploit variation in regulatory binding sectors 
(e.g. Card and Krueger 1995; Machin, Manning & Rahman 2003) or regional 
variation in minimum wage levels (e.g. Card and Krueger 2000) that is 
commonly used in the literature. In addition, analyses of individual-level 
administrative data often suffer from measurement error in identifying 
minimum wage recipients (e.g. Currie and Fallick 1996, and Abowd et al. 
2000; for a discussion on importance of a suitable datasets see also Stewart 
2002): the nature of the data can make it difficult to precisely distinguish 
workers receiving minimum wages from their slightly higher paid 
counterparts, especially in the presence for overtime pay, bonuses, or part-
time work. The richness of the data at hand facilitates an accurate 
identification of such workers – a critical component given that this 
information is used to form the treatment and control groups, as discussed 
below.  
 
Methodology 
 Below we outline the strategy to identify both employment and wage 
distribution effects of the minimum wage change, and then present the 
specification of estimated models for the analysis of labour market outcomes 
of interest: changes in employment transitions and distribution of wages. 
 
Identification strategy 
 To identify the effects of the minimum wage increase on selected 
labour market outcomes, in particular, to exclude potentially distorting 
factors which may systematically affect the outcomes of interest, we use a 
difference-in-differences approach based on ―before-and-after‖ as well as 
―treatment-and-control‖ comparisons. As we are dealing with the 
examination of a legislative change, a proper experimental approach is not 
feasible. Instead, we employ a ―quasi-experimental‖ approach where the 
policy change itself produces different groups of workers: some are directly 
affected by the minimum wage increase and hence form a natural treatment 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
89 
group, while others are not directly affected and hence form a control group. 
Comparing the differences in labour market outcomes for these two groups 
before and after the minimum wage change thus identifies the effect of the 
change in the minimum wage level – and, moreover, arguably allows for a 
causal interpretation.  
 Speaking formally, we define 𝐷 ∈  0,1  as the treatment operator 
equal to 1 if an individual receives treatment (i.e. is subject to a binding 
minimum wage increase) and zero otherwise. Let 𝑌 1  denote the treated 
outcome and 𝑌 0  denote the non-treated outcome. Additionally, let 𝑌𝑡  and 
𝑌𝑡+1 denote the outcomes prior to and after the 2010 minimum wage 
increases, respectively. The difference-in-differences estimator 𝜃𝑑𝑖𝑑  is then 
given by  
𝜃𝐷𝑖𝐷 = (𝐸 𝑌𝑡+1 1  | 𝐷 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌𝑡 0 | 𝐷 = 1 ) − (𝐸 𝑌𝑡+1(0)| 𝐷 = 0 
− 𝐸 𝑌𝑡(0)| 𝐷 = 0 ) (1)  
 In order for the estimator 𝜽𝒅𝒊𝒅 to provide an unbiased and consistent 
estimate of the average treatment effect in panel data, two assumptions must 
hold. First, the control and treatment groups must be subject to equal time 
trends – in this case, the underlying macroeconomic time trends must have 
affected the treatment and control groups equally. Secondly, treatment 
effects must be homogenous – i.e., the minimum wage increase must have 
impacted those in the treatment group in the same manner that a 
(counterfactual) increase would have affected the control group. Under these 
conditions,  
𝜃𝐷𝑖𝐷 = 𝐸 𝑌𝑡+1 1 − 𝑌𝑡+1 0  , 
(2)  
so that the difference-in-differences estimator 𝜽𝒅𝒊𝒅is an unbiased and 
consistent estimate of the average treatment effect.  
 Treatment and control groups are defined based on the position of 
workers in the wage distribution at the time of the introduction of the 
February 2010 law (see Table 2). The treatment group consists ofworkers 
who were directly affected by the legislative change, i.e., of workers whose 
wages at the time of the introduction of the February 2010 law were below 
the new minimum wage. This group is called a sub-minimum group (g1). The 
control group I consists of workers who, at the time of the introduction of 
the February 2010 law, received wages in the band between the new level of 
the minimum wage and the level of 1.2 times the new minimum wage. This 
group is called a supra-minimum group (g2). The residual controlgroup II 
consists of high paid workers.  
 As workers in the treatment group differ in terms of how much their 
wage had to be increased to reach the new minimum wage, we divide this 
group into two sub-groups: (i) lower sub-minimum group, containing 
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workers who received wages between the old minimum wage and wage up to 
10 percent higher than the old minimum wage; and (ii) upper sub-minimum 
group with wages higher than in the previous group but lower than the new 
minimum wage. 
 
Empirical model – effects on employment transitions 
 The effect of the minimum wage increase on the probability of 
remaining in employment is estimated on all individuals employed as of 
March 2010 and is modelled using the following specification: 
𝑃𝑟 𝑒𝑖𝑡+1 = 1| 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1 = 𝛼1𝑔1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑔3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . 
(3)  
where the dependant variable is binary and equal to 1 if individual i was 
employed at time 𝑡 + 1and 0 otherwise, conditional he/she was employed in 
time t. The variable g1it is a binary variable equal to 1 if wmt ≤ wit < wmt+1, 
and 0 otherwise; g3it is equal to 1 if wmt+1 × (1 + c) ≤ wit and 0 otherwise (see 
Table 2). The supra-minimum group g2, which includes those for whom 
wmt+1 ≤  wit < wmt+1× (1 + c), is the reference – control group. The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡  
contains explanatory demographic variables for individual i in time t. These 
include gender, age, tenure at current employer, education, type of 
employment contract (fixed-term or permanent), economic activity of 
employer. Parameter γt captures the time varying effects and εit the stochastic 
error.  
 The model for estimating job-to-job transitions is identical to the one 
in (90) with the exception of the dependant variable, which is equal to 1 if an 
individual is employed at time t + 1 at the same employer as in time t and 0 
otherwise. 
 To analyse the impact of the changed legislation on transitions into 
employment (from unemployment or other jobs), future versions of this 
paper will also examine the above question using a competing risks semi-
parametric framework that takes censoring into account.  Under this 
framework, individuals can transition into multiple, competing states – in our 
case, into indefinite employment contracts, fixed-term employment 
contracts, or unemployment. Each of these K competing states are associated 
with a specific hazard function𝜆𝑘 𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑋 : 
𝜆𝑘 𝑡, 𝒑, 𝑿 = 𝜆𝑘 ,0 𝑡  ∙ 𝑒
(𝒑𝛾𝑘+𝑿𝛽𝑘) 
(4)  
where p is a an indicator variable denoting the policy period, X is a set of 
control variables, 𝜆𝑘 ,0 𝑡  is the non-parametric baseline hazard for state k, 
and 𝛾𝑘  and 𝛽𝑘  are parameters to be estimated. Put differently, each specific 
hazard function is the instantaneous rate of transitioning into state k at time t 
conditional on survival until time t or later. A benefit of the competing risks 
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approach is that it can isolate the precise effect of the policy change by 
calculating the difference in the change of the hazard rate for transitioning to 
fixed-term employment 𝛾𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 −𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  and the hazard rate for transitioning to 
permanent employment 𝛾𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 . The coefficients in the model will be 
estimated via maximum likelihood method. 
 
Empirical model – effects on wage distribution 
 The spillover effects of the minimum wage increase are also 
estimated using the difference in differences framework, following similar 
approaches by Stewart (2012) and Neumark et al. (2004). The analysis 
compares changes in wages between the period preceding the large increase 
in the minimum wage with the following period across workers at different 
wage levels. We interpret disproportionate wage increases for individual 
closer to the new, higher minimum wage as spillover effects of the minimum 
wage increase. 
 The dependant variable in the model to be estimated is wage growth 
between consecutive years, denoted 
𝑤2𝑖𝑡−𝑤1𝑖𝑡
𝑤1𝑖𝑡
. Here we distinguish between 
periods without large minimum wage changes, and periods from the 
introduction of the new minimum wage in March 2010 onwards. The model 
to be estimated can be specified as  
𝑤2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑤1𝑖𝑡
𝑤1𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡𝑖 + 𝜃𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . 
(5)  
 The variable gi is a binary variable equal to 1 for individuals in the 
treatment group and 0 for those in the control. The variable ti is equal to 0 for 
observations referring to periods without minimum wage changes and 1 
otherwise. The parameter θ denotes the difference-in-difference estimator of 
the effect of minimum wage increase. The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡  contains explanatory 
demographic variables for individual i in time t. These include gender, age, 
tenure at current employer, education, type of employment contract (fixed-
term or permanent), economic activity of employer, and type of employer 
(e.g. sole proprietor, LLC).   
 The choice of observation period is important for accurately gauging 
the estimates of spillover effects. The baseline period (ti = 0) is defined as the 
year between September 2008 and September 2009. This choice is dictated 
by the prior minimum wage adjustments – in August 2008, the nominal 
minimum wage was increased by 4 percent, and in August 2009, the 
minimum wage increased by 1.4 percent. The latter change was arguably 
small compared to the 22.7 percent increase in March 2010. In order to 
ensure comparability, the follow-up period (ti = 1) is defined as the period 
from September 2009 and September 2010. 
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 In an attempt to exclude the effect of factors which could indirectly 
affect the growth of an individual's earnings, we restrict the spillover 
analysis to a subset of the population. The sample on which the model is 
estimated is restricted to those employed full-time for the entirety of the 
period between 2008 and 2010 at a given employer. In addition, we exclude 
individuals whose educational credentials improved during this period. Also, 
we include only those employed in the non-agricultural business sector. In 
the public sector wage bargaining is highly centralized; in addition, 
comparably few workers are paid the minimum wage. 
 
Results 
 Below we present the results of the minimum wage increase in March 
2010 on employment transitions and wage distribution.  
 
The effect of the minimum wage increase on worker transitions  
 Two types of worker transitions are analysed: separation from 
employment and transition to another job. 
 
Separation from employment 
 The minimum wage increase in March 2010 had a negative effect on 
job retention. In comparison to the control group – the supra-minimum group 
– one year after the minimum wage increase workers of the lower sub-
minimum group had 5.6 percent, and workers of the upper sub-minimum 
group had 1.8 percent lower probability of staying in employment (see Table 
3, specification I). By contrast, high paid workers group had a 3.7 percent 
higher probability of staying in employment than workers in the control – the 
supra-minimum – group. 
 Other coefficients of specification I are also of interest. First, the 
probability of staying in employment increases with age and tenure (results 
that hold true also for other specifications presented in Table 3). One 
explanation for this finding relates to the layoff cost. For example, younger 
workers have lower tenure and are often involved in temporary forms of 
employment, resulting in lower dismissal costs for the employers. Second, 
the probability of staying in employment is higher for workers on permanent 
employment. This is an expected result, as the costs of the separation of 
worker under permanent contract are higher for both the worker and 
employer. Third, the probability of staying in employment is lower among 
low-education workers, possibly because low-education workers are less 
likely to quit given their lower re-employment prospects compared to high-
education workers. And fourth, the probability of staying in employment is 
lower in service industries, where the share of minimum wage earners is 
considerably higher. 
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 The adverse effects of the minimum wage increase on the probability 
of staying employed were higher for young and for low-education workers. 
As shown in specification II (Table 3), one year after the legislative change 
young workers in the lower sub-minimum group had 7.2 percent, and 
workers of the upper sub-minimum group had 2.2 percent lower probability 
of staying employed than comparable young workers in the supra-minimum 
group. Similar to the specification for all workers, high paid young workers 
also had a higher probability of staying in employment than workers in the 
control – the supra-minimum – group. Interestingly, the probability of 
staying in employment was higher among low-education young workers 
(Table 3, specification II).
16
 As expected, the minimum wage hike also 
reduced the probability of job retention among older workers, but the 
magnitude of the marginal estimates is smaller than for young workers 
(Table 3, specification III). This reflects the disadvantaged position of the 
young in the labour market compared to older workers, a phenomenon well 
established in the literature.  
 Specifications IV and V (Table 3) present results for low- and high-
education workers. They show that low-education workers in the treatment 
group – those low-education workers directly affected by the legislative 
change – had between 2.5 to 6.2 percent lower probability of staying 
employed than low-education workers in the supra-minimum group (see 
specification IV). Although the probability of staying employed decreased 
also for high-education workers (specification V), the relative differences 
between sub- and supra-minimum groups were smaller than among low-
education workers. These results suggest that firms might have reacted to the 
minimum wage hike by substituting low-education workers by more 
productive, high-education workers or by avoiding hiring low-education 
workers. The estimates are in line with most of the empirical studies in the 
field (see Neumark and Wascher 2010 for an overview). 
 Estimates in Table 4 extend the results presented above by applying a 
multinominal probit model to analyse the effect of the minimum wage 
increase on the probability of making a transition from employment to non-
employment, that is, by allowing for two types for exit: to unemployment 
and inactivity. The results are consistent with previous findings, showing that 
workers included in the treatment groups – in both lower and upper sub-
minimum groups – were more likely to exit from employment to both 
unemployment and inactivity.  The exit probability is especially high for 
transition into inactivity – workers in the sub-minimum group had 2.1 to 5.3 
                                                          
16
 One possible explanation for this result is that young low-education workers have longer 
work experience than young high-education workers and, therefore, higher probability of 
being employed under the permanent contract. 
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percent higher probability of exiting to inactivity than workers in the supra-
minimum group (see Table 4, specification II).  
 Results presented above compare the probability of staying employed 
between workers directly affected by the minimum wage increase and 
workers with slightly higher wages than the new minimum wage in the 
period after the legislative change. A more appropriate approach to estimate 
the effects of the new law is a difference-in-differences approach, comparing 
differences in probability of staying employed between sub- and supra-
minimum groups before and after the change (see the section on 
identification strategy above).  
 The difference-in-differences approach confirms that the new 
minimum wage law had negative effect on job retention. As shown in Table 
5, the difference in probability of staying employed for workers in the sub-
minimum group in comparison to workers in the supra-minimum group 
additionally decreased in the period after the legislative change – from –0.7 
percent in 2008–09 (–1.5 percent in 2009–10) to –2.8 percentage points in 
2010–11. The results also show that the minimum wage increase had a 
disproportionally large negative effect on job retention of vulnerable groups 
of workers. For young workers, the difference in probability of staying 
employed between the sub-minimum and supra-minimum groups declined 
from –1.6 percent in 2008–09 (–2.3 percent in 2009–10) to –4.1 percentage 
points in 2010–11, and for low-education workers from –1.0 percent in 
2008–09 (–1.7 percent in 2009–10) to –3.8 percent in 2010–11. 
 The above approach is not a full-fledged difference-in-differences 
approach, as the ―before‖ and the ―after‖ differences between treatment and 
control groups are estimated in separate regressions, and the difference-in-
differences calculated from them. A more sophisticated approach – where 
the difference-in-differences estimate will be obtained as a parameter 
estimate in a regression – is underway. As another improvement to be 
included in the final version of the paper, we plan to estimate semi-
parameteric hazard rate model as alternative estimation methods to 
logit/probit models. 
 
Probability of transition to another job 
 The results also show that minimum wage hike increased the 
probability of job-to-job transitions. Table 6 shows that individuals in sub-
minimum groups had a higher probability of changing job than comparable 
individuals in the control – the supra-minimum – group. The probability of 
moving to another job is especially high among workers in the lower sub-
minimum group – they had 3.8 percent higher probability of being employed 
in another job after one year than comparable workers in the supra-minimum 
group (Table 6, specification I). A plausible interpretation of this result is 
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that these workers were more likely to lose their employment after the 
minimum wage increase and were forced to move to another job.  
 The probability of changing jobs was higher among young and low-
education workers. Young workers in the lower sub-minimum group had 4.1 
percent, and those in upper sub-minimum group 1.7 percent, higher 
probability of moving to another job than young workers in the control – the 
supra-minimum – group (Table 6, specification II). Similarly, low-education 
workers in the lower sub-minimum group had 4.3 percent, and those in upper 
sub-minimum group 2.8 percent, higher probability of moving to another job 
than low-education workers in the control – the supra-minimum – 
group(Table 6, specification IV). Noteworthy are also parameter estimates of 
control variables. For example, women and workers with high tenure are less 
likely to change jobs, and transitions between jobs are less likely to occur in 
industrial activities as compared to market services.  
 How does the probability of job-to-job transitions differ between the 
old and the new minimum wage laws? Comparison of estimates (Table 7) 
shows that under the new law, workers in the treatment group – those 
directly affected by the minimum wage increase – were relatively more 
likely to have changed their jobs than under the old law. That is, the 
difference in probability of changing job for workers in the sub-minimum in 
comparison to the supra-minimum group increased in the period after the 
minimum wage increase from 2 percent in 2009–10 to 2.8 percent in 2010–
11. The probability of changing job increased especially among young 
workers (from 1.1 to 2.4), whereas there were no major differences among 
low-education workers.  
 
The effect of the minimum wage increase on distribution of wages  
 The increase in the minimum wage in March 2010 has remarkably 
increased the concentration of low wage workers at the minimum. As shown 
in Figure 4, the legislative change caused an increased concentration at the 
bottom of the wage distribution and, due to a sharp increase of the minimum 
wage earners, created a spike at the minimum. A small concentration of 
minimum wage earners can be also observed at the reduced minimum wage 
rate in 2010, which was applied by firms in financial distress (those firms 
could adhere to a gradual transition to a new minimum wage, see above). 
The effect of the minimum wage increase on the wage distribution was more 
pronounced in market services, where the share of minimum wage earners 
was high also before the legislative change (see Figure 5). 
 The minimum wage hike exacerbated disparities in the wage 
distributions between young and adult workers as well between low- and 
high-education workers. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, the new law 
increased the concentration of minimum wage earners at the minimum 
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among young workers and especially among low-education workers. In this 
group we can also observe considerable spikes at the reduced minimum 
wage rate, implying that a larger share of these workers were employed in 
firms in financial difficulties. Interestingly, the concentration of minimum 
wage earners increased also among high-education workers, yet the effect 
was rather small.  
 The minimum wage change also coincided with wage increases 
higher up in the wage distribution, although at diminishing rate. Table 8 
reports the regression difference-in-differences estimates on the effect of 
minimum wage increase on wage growth. The estimates reveal positive and 
statistically significant spillover effects of the minimum wage increase that 
are more pronounced for wage levels near the new minimum wage. In 
particular, workers in the lowest treatment group – whose wages were up to 
10 percent higher than the new minimum wage – recorded 3.4 percentage 
points higher wage growth compared to workers in the control group I. For 
workers in higher treatment groups – those higher up in the wage distribution 
– the estimated elasticities become smaller, although they are still 
statistically significant.  
 The robustness of the above results is confirmed by using an 
alternative control group (control group II): workers with wages between the 
median and the average wage (before the minimum wage increase). In this 
case, the spillover effects are even more pronounced, also due to the lower 
growth of control group wages. For example, wages of workers in the lowest 
treatment group – those with up to 10 percent higher wage than the new 
minimum wage – have exceeded the growth of the control group II wages by 
4.5 percentage points. The spillover effects are statistically significant, but 
monotonically decreasing, for other treatment groups with higher wages.  
 Due to considerable differences in the wage distribution and in the 
concentration of minimum wage earners at the minimum between industries, 
we estimated spillover effects also separately for workers employed in 
industrial activities and in market services (Table 9). Spillover effects are 
observed in both sectors, with more pronounced effects recorded in market 
services. Compared to control group I, wages of workers in the lowest 
treatment group increased by up to 2 percentage points in industrial activities 
and by up to 4.4 percentage points in market services. Spillover effects 
extend also higher up in the wage distribution, especially in the market 
services. 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on rich microlevel data, this paper analyses the effects of the 
introduction of the Februay 2010 minimum wage law in Slovenia on 
transitions from employment and on distribution of wages. The results show 
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that the resulting minimum wage hike increased the probability of transitions 
from employment – to unemployment, inactivity and another job – for 
workers directly affected by the minimum wage increase, an effect 
particularly pronounced for young and low-education workers. Moreover, 
the minimum wage hike increased the number of minimum wage recipients, 
created a spike at the bottom of wage distribution, and via spillover effect 
statistically significantly increased wages that were up to 30 percent higher 
than the new minimum wage.  
 The above results underpin a key dilemma in setting the minimum 
wages: while the minimum wage increase helps to redistribute earnings to 
low-paid workers, this redistribution may well happen at the expense of 
employment, an effect that disproportionally affects precisely the groups the 
minimum wage is intended to help: the young and low-education workers.  
To be able to provide more reliable guidance for Slovenian policymakers, 
analysis of several additional aspects related to the minimum wage hike are 
of essence, ranging from obtaining a more precise estimate of the jobs shed, 
assessing the change in the share of earnings going to low-paid workers, and, 
above all, delving into the productivity consequences of the minimum wage 
hike – both short- and long-term ones.  Minimum wage policy can affect 
productivity through a variety of channels, through substitution effects and 
adjustments in technology and in business processes. 
 It has to be stressed that the above results are preliminary, to be 
refined with further, more detailed analyses. Among others, we will 
complement the empirical results of logit/probit models by estimating hazard 
rate models, and improve the application of the difference-in-differences 
method in estimating employment transition models by directly estimating 
the average treatment effect. In addition, we intend to further verify the 
legitimacy of the construction of the treatment and control groups – a 
necessary condition for interpreting the estimates as reflecting causality and 
not merely statistical association. 
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Tables and figures  
Table 1: The minimum wage as the percentage of average and median wages of workers 
employed full time in EU member states, 2012 
 
% average wage   % median wage 
France 49.8  France 61.5 
Slovenia 48.3  Slovenia 59.5 
Malta 46.8  Portugal 57.7 
Belgium 44.6  Hungary 53.9 
Ireland 43.7  Latvia 50.9 
The Netherlands 41.2  Belgium 50.7 
Hungary 39.6  Lithuania 47.8 
Portugal 39.6  Ireland 47.6 
United Kingdom 38.8  United Kingdom 47.2 
Latvia 38  Slovakia 47 
Poland 37.9  The Netherlands 46.9 
Bulgaria 37.8  Poland 46.5 
Slovakia 36.8  Romania 45.2 
Lithuania 35.7  Spain 44.2 
Croatia 35.6  Greece 43.4 
Spain 34.9  Luxembourg 42 
Luxembourg 34.5  Czech Republic 36 
Romania 31.2  Estonia 35.7 
Czech Republic 30.6  Bulgaria .. 
Estonia 30  Croatia .. 
Greece 29.5  Malta .. 
Average 38.3  Average 48.6 
Notes: 
Data for Bulgaria, Croatia and Malta were collected from Eurostat (2014). Data for other 
countries were obtained from OECD.Stat (2014). Data gathered from OECD.Stat refer to all 
employed workers, whereas data from Eurostat only to workers employed in activities B – S 
(NACE Rev. 2). 
.. no data available 
Sources: Eurostat 2014; OECD.Stat 2014. 
 
Table 2: Definition of treatment and control groups 
Name of the group Purpose Condition 
g1: Sub-minimum group Treatment wmt ≤ wit < wmt+1 
g2:  Supra-minimum group Control I wmt+1 ≤  wit < wmt+1× (1 + c) 
g3: High-paid workers Control II wmt+1× (1 + c) ≤ wit 
Legend:witdenotes wage of individual i in the period t (i.e., before the minimum wage 
increase), wmt is the minimum wage in period t, wmt+1 is the minimum wage in period t + 1 
(i.e., after the minimum wage increase), c denotes the width of the band of the control group 
(for example, 20 percent of the new minimum wage). 
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Table 3: Probability of staying employed one year after the minimum wage increase, 
(probit) marginal effects 
 
All 
workers 
Young 
workers 
(age ≤ 30) 
Older 
workers 
(age > 30) 
Low-
education 
workers 
High-
education 
workers 
 I II III IV V 
Reference group: workers with wages up to 20 percent higher than the new minimum wage 
(supra-minimum group) 
Lower sub-
minimum group 
–0.056*** –0.072*** –0.053*** –0.062*** –0.051*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Upper sub-
minimum group 
–0.018*** –0.022*** –0.018*** –0.025*** –0.015*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
High-paid 
workers 
0.037*** 0.047*** 0.037** 0.027*** 0.043*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Explanatory variables (all variables, with exception of age and tenure, are binary) 
Women 
–0.001 –0.013*** 0.001 –0.005*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 
0.031*** 0.136*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age
2
 
–0.000*** –0.002*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Low-education 
workers 
–0.005*** 0.016*** –0.009***   
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)   
Permanent 
employment 
0.049*** 0.081*** 0.043*** 0.058*** 0.045*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industrial 
activities 
0.011*** 0.049*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Number of 
observations 
697,063 83,134 613,929 276,439 420,624 
 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The dependent variable: probability of staying employed in period t + 1, conditional on 
employment in period t. 
[2] Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Multinominal probit model of transition probabilities (reference groups: workers 
who stayed employed) 
 Exit to unemployment Exit to inactivity 
 I. II. 
Reference group: workers whose wages are up to 20 percent higher than the new minimum wage (supra-minimum 
group) 
Lower sub-minimum group 
0.011*** 0.053*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Upper sub-minimum group 
0.007*** 0.021*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
High-paid workers 
–0.032*** –0.021*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Explanatory variables (all variables, with exception of age and tenure, are binary) 
Women 
–0.002*** –0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Age 
–0.012*** –0.023*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Age2 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 
0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Low-education workers 
–0.022*** –0.045*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Permanent employment 
–0.005** 0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.17 
Number of observations 662,634 662,634 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The analysis includes workers, who were employed in March 2010. The probability of 
exit to non-employment is estimated one year after the legislative change. 
[2] Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 5: Probability of staying employed (marginal effects) – comparison of estimates 
before and after the legislative change 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The dependent variable: probability of staying in employed in period t + 1, conditionally 
that the person was employed in period t. 
[2] For each specification we estimated the conditional probit model. We present only 
marginal effects for the sub-minimum groups or workers, who have been directly affected 
by the legislative change. The parameter estimates of other explanatory variables are similar 
to those in Table 3. 
 
Reference group: workers whose wages are 
up to 20 percent higher than the new 
minimum wage (supra-minimum group) 
Before the legislative change 
After the 
legislative 
change 
2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
All workers 
–0,007*** 
(0,001) 
–0,015*** 
(0,001) 
–0,028*** 
(0,000) 
Young workers 
–0,016*** 
(0,001) 
–0,023*** 
(0,001) 
–0,041*** 
(0,001) 
Low-education workers 
–0,010*** 
(0,001) 
–0,017*** 
(0,001) 
–0,038*** 
(0,000) 
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Table 6:Probability of changing job one year after the legislative change, marginal effects 
 All workers 
Young 
workers 
(age ≤ 30) 
Older 
workers 
(age > 30) 
Low-
education 
workers 
High-
education 
workers 
 I II III IV V 
Reference group: workers whose wages are up to 20 percent higher than the new minimum wage 
(supra-minimum group) 
Lower sub-
minimum group 
0,038*** 0,041*** 0,039*** 0,043*** 0,036*** 
(0,002) (0,006) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) 
Upper sub-
minimum group 
0,025*** 0,017*** 0,026*** 0,028*** 0,023*** 
(0,001) (0,004) (0,001) (0,002) (0,002) 
High-paid workers 
–0,048*** –0,070*** –0,045*** –0,047*** –0,049*** 
(0,001) (0,004) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) 
Explanatory variables (all variables, with exception of age and tenure, are binary) 
Women 
–0,021*** 0,002*** –0,025*** –0,030*** –0,017*** 
(0,001) (0,003) (0,001) (0,009) (0,001) 
Age 
–0,004*** 0,012 –0,003*** 0,001* –0,007*** 
(0,000) (0,014) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) 
Age2 
0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** –0,000*** –0,000*** 
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Tenure 
–0,009*** –0,008*** –0,012*** –0,005*** –0,003*** 
(0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) 
Low-education 
workers 
–0,007*** –0,029*** –0,005***   
(0,001) (0,003) (0,001)   
Permanent 
employment 
0,003*** 0,009*** 0,007*** 0,001*** 0,006*** 
(0,001) (0,003) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) 
Industrial activities 
–0,037*** –0,129*** –0,028*** –0,042*** –0,032*** 
(0,001) (0,005) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) 
Pseudo R2 0,09 0,11 0,11 0,08 0,09 
Number of 
observations 
638,753 74,455 564,298 247,706 391,047 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The dependent variable: probability of changing job in period t + 1, conditional on 
employment in period t. 
[2] Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7:Probability of changing employer (marginal effects) – comparison before and after 
the legislative change 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The dependent variable: probability of changing job in period t + 1, conditionally that the 
person was employed in period t. 
[2] For each specification we estimated the conditional probit model. We present only 
marginal effects for the sub-minimum groups or workers, who have been directly affected 
by the legislative change. The direction of other explanatory variables is similar as in Table 
6. 
 
Table 8: Regression difference-in-differences estimates of the spillover effect 
Treatment group 
(% of minimum wage in March 
2010) 
Control group I Control group II 
100 – 110 % 
0.034*** 0.045*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
111 – 120 % 
0.024*** 0.035*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
121 – 130 % 
0.017*** 0.028*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
131 – 140 % 
0.012*** 0.023*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
141 – 150 % 
0.009*** 0.020 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The dependent variable: wage growth between year 1 and 2. In the table above we 
present only regression coefficients and standard errors for the difference-in-differences 
estimates (parameter 𝜃). 
[2] Control group 1: workers with wages higher than 150 percent of the new minimum 
wage, but lower than the median wage. Control group II: workers with wages higher than 
the median wage, but lower than the average wage. 
[3] Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
[4] Number of observations: 72.910 – 83.552 in specifications with control group I; and 
134.584 – 145.226 in specifications with control group II. 
 
Reference group: workers whose wages are up to 20 percent 
higher than the new minimum wage (supra-minimum group) 
Before the 
legislative change 
After the 
legislative change 
2009–2010 2010–2011 
All workers 
–0,020*** 
(0,001) 
0,028*** 
(0,001) 
Young workers 
0,011** 
(0,004) 
0,024*** 
(0,001) 
Low-education workers 
0,028*** 
(0,001) 
0,031*** 
(0,002) 
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Table 9: Regression difference-in-differences estimates of the spillover effect, industry and 
market services 
Experimental 
group 
(% of minimum 
wage in March 
2010) 
Industry Market services 
Control group 
I 
Control group 
II 
Control group 
I 
Control group 
II 
 I II III IV 
100 – 110 % 
0.020*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.055*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
111 – 120 % 
0.015*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
121 – 130 % 
0.010*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.032*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
131 – 140 % 
0.007** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
141 – 150 % 
0.005** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: 
[1] The dependent variable: wage growth between year 1 and 2. In the table above we 
present only regression coefficients and standard errors for the difference-in-differences 
estimates (parameter 𝜃). 
[2] Control group 1: workers with wages higher than 150 percent of the new minimum 
wage, but lower than the median wage. Control group II: workers with wages higher than 
the median wage, but lower than the average wage. 
[3] Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
[4] According to the NACE Rev. 2, industrial sectors  are B–E, whereas market services 
refer to industries F–N and R–S. 
[5] Number of observations in industry sector: 31.361 – 35.478 in specifications with control 
group I; and 53.994 – 56.176 in specifications with control group II. Number of observations 
in market services: 40.733 – 48.978 in specifications with control group I; and 79.273 – 
87.518 in specifications with control group II. 
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Figure 1: The ratio between the minimum and average gross wage, real minimum wages 
and real average gross wages, 2005–2013 
 
Sources: Authors‘ calculation based on data from SORS (2014) and overview of minimum 
wage legislation. 
Figure 2: Number of workers in firms that receive the minimum wage, private and public 
sectors, January 2005-December 2013 
 
Note: Public sector includes to the following industries: public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security, education, and health and social work. 
Source: SORS 2014. 
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Figure 3: Number of firms that employ at least one minimum wage earner, January 2005-
December 2013 
 
Source: SORS 2014. 
 
Figure 4: Wage distribution, 2009–2011 
 
Note: 
[1] First red vertical line (from left to right) denotes the reduced minimum wage rate in 
March 2010 for firms entitled to gradual increase of the minimum wage  (i. e., 3.7 euro per 
hour); the second line indicates the regular minimum wage rate in March 2010 (i.e., 4,1 euro 
per hour). 
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Figure 5: Wage distribution, industry (a) and market services (b), 2009–2011 
 
(a) industry 
 
(b) market services 
Notes: 
[1] According to Nace Rev. 2, industrial activies include activities B–E, whereas market 
services activities F–N and R–S. 
[2] First red vertical line (from left to right) denotes the reduced minimum wage rate in 
March 2010 for firms entitled to gradual increase of the minimum wage  (i. e., 3.7 euro per 
hour); the second line indicates the regular 
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Figure 6: Wage distribution by age groups, 2009–2011 
 
Note: 
[1] First red vertical line (from left to right) denotes the reduced minimum wage rate in 
March 2010 for firms entitled to gradual increase of the minimum wage  (i. e., 3.7 euro per 
hour); the second line indicates the regular minimum wage rate in March 2010 (i.e., 4,1 euro 
per hour). 
 
Figure 7: Wage distribution among low- and high-education workers, 2009–2011 
 
Note: 
[1] First red vertical line (from left to right) denotes the reduced minimum wage rate in 
March 2010 for firms entitled to gradual increase of the minimum wage  (i. e., 3.7 euro per 
hour); the second line indicates the regular minimum wage rate in March 2010 (i.e., 4,1 euro 
per hour). 
  
